

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
EASTERN DIVISION**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	
Plaintiff,)	MEMORANDUM IN
)	SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
- vs -)	MOTION TO SUPPRESS
)	EVIDENCE
RED FAWN FALLIS,)	
Defendant.)	No. CR 17-00016-DHL-1

Defendant Red Fawn Fallis, by her counsel, files the following Memorandum in support of her Motion to Suppress all evidence seized and statements allegedly made by her following an October 27, 2017 seizure of her person that was constitutionally unlawful and violated her rights under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS.

A. Introduction.

In early 2016, construction of the Energy Transfer Partners’ Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) was approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The pipeline was projected to run from the Bakken oil fields in western North Dakota, beneath the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, to southern Illinois where it would end at an oil tank farm near Patoka, Illinois.

The route took the pipeline under part of Lake Oahe and in close proximity to the reservation occupied by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.¹ Many members of the Tribe believed that the intended route jeopardized the region's clean water and, thereby, negatively impacted hunting and fishing rights, as well as posing a threat to the tribe’s ancient burial grounds.

In the Spring of 2016, three federal agencies - the EPA, the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation - also expressed concern about the

¹ The Standing Rock Reservation is the fifth largest Native American reservation in the U.S. It is located in North and South Dakota and is home to more than 6,000 members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, part of what was formerly known as the Great Sioux Nation.

proximity of the pipeline to the Tribe's water source and raised the issue of environmental justice.²

In April 2016, members of the Tribe established Sacred Stone Camp as a center for historic preservation and spiritual resistance to the pipeline. Two other main camps were established later as the numbers of persons opposing the construction route grew and, by late September of 2016, members of more than 300 federally recognized Native American tribes were residing in the three main camps, alongside an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 supporters of the Tribe and opponents of the DAPL, collectively known as "water protectors". Several thousand more gathered at the camps on weekends.³ By September 2016, the protests constituted the single largest gathering of Native Americans in 100 years.⁴

At least seventy-six local, county, and state law enforcement agencies from at least ten states⁵ were deployed in response to the encampments.⁶ By mid-October, at least five private security companies were contracted to provide security for DAPL and assistance to law enforcement.⁷

The Tribe's efforts to stop the construction of the pipeline by filing suit in federal court were initially unsuccessful⁸ but, on September 9, 2016, the Departments of Justice, Interior, and the Army issued a joint statement temporarily halting the construction of the pipeline on the

² Indian Country Today Media Network [April 28, 2016] ("Exhibit A"); See also, case analysis in *Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, No. 1:16-cv-01534 (D. Columbia), Opinion (June 14, 2017).

³ Daniel A. Medina for NBC News [9/23/16] ("Exhibit B").

⁴ Northcott, Charlie (September 2, 2016). "Life in the Native American oil protest camps". BBC ("Exhibit C").

⁵ Officers responded from states including North Dakota, Louisiana, Montana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nebraska, Indiana, and Ohio.

⁶ American Civil Liberties Union, <https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/rights-protesters/how-many-law-enforcement-agencies-does-it-take-subdue-peaceful> (listing seventy-six responding law enforcement agencies, all but one confirmed by Morton County Sheriff's Department and/or news reports) ("Exhibit D").

⁷ FRAGO 10.20.16.001 (listing private security contractors TigerSwan, Russell Group of Texas, SRC, Leighton, and 10Code LLC) ("Exhibit E").

⁸ *Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, No. 1:16-cv-01534 (D. Columbia), Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (July 27, 2016).

federal land surrounding Lake Oahe and asked the company to voluntarily halt construction in a larger area.⁹

In early September, the DAPL brought in an unlicensed private firm¹⁰ to provide security while construction workers bulldozed a section of land which was subject to a pending injunction motion and which the Tribe believed contained burial grounds and historic artifacts.¹¹ Water protectors who entered the area were attacked by trained dogs handled by private security workers.¹²

By late October, the Army Corps of Engineers had not yet made a final decision on whether to grant an easement to build under the Missouri River. DAPL's position was that the "company would continue building up to the lake's edge even before the easement decision" due to the cost of delay.¹³

⁹ Dept. of Justice (9 September 2016). "Joint Statement from the Department of Justice, the Department of the Army and the Department of the Interior Regarding Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers". Office of Public Affairs, United States Department of Justice ("Exhibit F").

¹⁰ The Bismarck Tribune (10/25/16) reported: "Investigators: Dog Handlers Were Not Licensed to Work Security" in an article ("Exhibit G") explaining that the Morton County Sheriff's Department found the dog-handling security officers were operating without a license, a violation of North Dakota criminal law (see ND Cent. Code §§ 43-30-05, 43-30-10).

¹¹ *Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, No. 1:16-cv-01534 (D. Columbia), Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion For a Temporary Restraining Order, p. 3-4 (September 4, 2016) (indicating that DAPL bulldozed stone features marking sacred area containing burial grounds on September 3, 2016, less than 24 hours after the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe submitted evidence to the D.C. District Court identifying these features as "historically and religiously important") ("Exhibit H").

¹² Exhibit G.

¹³ West Fargo Pioneer (10/9/16), "Appeals Court Rejects Request to Stop Pipeline Work; Company Still Needs Corps' Permission to Build Under Missouri River", <http://www.westfargopioneer.com/news/4132953-appeals-court-rejects-request-stop-pipeline-work-company-still-needs-corps-permission> ("Exhibit I").

As of October 27, 2016, the Tribe was still involved in litigation with the Army Corps of Engineers and Dakota Access, LLC¹⁴ over construction of the pipeline, potential damage to the environment, the impact of a spill on the Tribe's hunting and fishing rights, and the environmental justice aspects of the project itself.¹⁵

As of October 27, 2016, the Army Corps of Engineers was also still seeking more time to study the impact of its plan. In a news release two weeks later, it said: "The Army has determined that additional discussion and analysis are warranted in light of the history of the Great Sioux Nation's dispossessions of lands, the importance of Lake Oahe to the Tribe, our government-to-government relationship, and the statute governing easements through government property."¹⁶

B. The Events of October 27, 2016.

On October 27, 2016, law enforcement officers from numerous agencies, both within and outside North Dakota, in collaboration with private security firms contracted by Energy Transfer Partners,¹⁷ undertook a large-scale paramilitary-style action to evict a group of Lakota tribal members and water protectors from an encampment known as the "North Camp," whose

¹⁴ The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe was joined by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe as plaintiffs in the litigation.

¹⁵ *Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, No. 1:16-cv-01534 (D. Columbia), Memorandum Opinion, pp. 7, 13 (10/11/17).

¹⁶ www.usace.army.mil/media/news-releases [Statement of November 14, 2016; Release No. 16-027] ("Exhibit J").

¹⁷ The North Dakota Private Investigative and Security Board has alleged that TigerSwan, the lead security contractor, was operating illegally during the joint law enforcement/private security operation which resulted in Fallis' arrest. Bismarck Tribune, "Dakota Access Security Firm Operated In ND Without License, Board Says" ("Exhibit K"); see also *North Dakota Private Investigative and Security Board v. TigerSwan, LLC and James Patrick Reese*, "Verified Complaint and Request for Injunction" available online at: <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3880181/TigerSwan-Complaint.pdf>.

occupants were allegedly blocking construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline. As part of that action, officers moved protesters southbound away from North Camp.

During the late afternoon of October 27, a line of law enforcement officers was stationed in front of water protectors along Highway 1806.¹⁸ Deputies Rusty Schmidt and Thadiaz Schmit were two of the Pennington County (South Dakota) Sheriff's officers in the line.¹⁹ Deputy Schmidt was eventually placed on an "arrest team" that was instructed to identify and target "agitators."²⁰ By approximately 5:50 p.m., most of the tribal members and water protectors had moved south and away from the law enforcement vehicles and created what the officers described as a 20-yard buffer between law enforcement and protesters.²¹ During this apparent lull in activity, officers began preparing to move ahead and evict protesters from the area.

Red Fawn Fallis, a Lakota Sioux woman and a resident of the Rosebud Camp, arrived on the scene of the protest on her ATV shortly after this time.²² This was her first visit to the site on October 27, 2017.

Ms. Fallis parked her ATV near the roadway and walked toward law enforcement officers. According to Deputy Schmit, Ms. Fallis was wearing a gas mask, "screaming at [a] mobile field force member and [] using her finger to point at [an unidentified officer] in an

¹⁸ Pennington County Sheriff Case Report ("Exhibit L"), p. 2.

¹⁹ 10/28/16 ND BCI Rusty Schmidt Interview Report (Exhibit M), p. 2.

²⁰ Exhibit M, p. 2.

²¹ Exhibit L, p. 3.

²² Unmanned Aircraft System Video from October 27, 2016.mpg ("Exhibit N") at 9:45.

While Ms. Fallis was present in the general vicinity of this police line minutes prior to this moment, it is only at this point that she pulled up, parked her ATV and approached the line. See ND BCI Additional Videos and Photographs Report ("Exhibit O"), p. 2 ("At 9:45 minutes into the video [] a four wheeler is driving north along 1806. . . . At 10:02 minutes into the video, someone, believed to be RED FAWN FALLIS, gets off the four wheeler and walks over towards law enforcement.").

aggressive manner.”²³ When questioned about the content of the speech Ms. Fallis directed toward law enforcement officers, Deputy Schmit stated that he “remember[ed] hearing, you know, what most of them were saying about water is life and you’re killing mother earth and stuff of that nature.”²⁴ Ms. Fallis was “within [approximately] 4-6 feet of the police line” at this time, and could not be heard by a North Dakota Highway Patrol officer from a distance of approximately 15-20 feet.²⁵

According to Deputy Schmit, who was located near the front of the police line, there were no riot conditions at the time of the alleged confrontation between Ms. Fallis and law enforcement and, in fact, “there had been a cease [sic] to the confrontations between [law enforcement] and protesters for approximately 10 to 15 minutes” and “everyone else [except one individual] was calm” at the time that Ms. Fallis is alleged to have yelled at the police line.²⁶

Minutes later, Deputy Schmidt was told by Deputy Schmit that “officers wanted [Fallis] arrested if possible as she was screaming at them, getting in their faces and not moving back when ordered.”²⁷ Video footage²⁸ does not show aggressive behavior on Ms. Fallis’ part, and the government has not provided body camera or other video evidence to support the allegation that police ordered Ms. Fallis to “move back”.

²³ Exhibit L, p. 3.

²⁴ In an interview with North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigations (BCI) Special Agent Arenz, Audio Recording of Interview With Deputy T. Schmit (“Exhibit P”) at 21:20-21:40.

²⁵ 10/30/16 North Dakota Highway Patrol Incident Report Excerpt (Pulver, Christopher) (“Exhibit Q”).

²⁶ Exhibit L, p. 3.

²⁷ Exhibit L, p. 2.²⁷

²⁸ Provided by the United States in discovery. See Exhibit N.

Rather, the video footage depicts Ms. Fallis being tackled from behind by Deputy Schmit less than four minutes after she got off of her red ATV in the vicinity of the police line. At the time she was tackled, she was walking parallel to the police line and not approaching the line. Video footage depicts a violent encounter where Ms. Fallis is tackled from behind and body slammed to the ground.²⁹

Deputy Schmit acknowledges that Ms. Fallis was “walking away from [him]” as he approached her from behind, and that he “wrapped [his] arms around [her] and began trying to pull her behind the skirmish lines to effect an arrest.”³⁰ Deputy Schmidt says that his fellow officer [Schmit] “... quickly wrapped his arms around her bringing her to the ground.”³¹

Neither Deputy R. Schmidt nor Deputy T. Schmit allege that Ms. Fallis initiated physical contact with any officers, made any threats, participated in a riot, or engaged in any act of violence prior to her seizure.

* * *

Following her seizure, law enforcement officers seized certain items of physical evidence that they allege were in Ms. Fallis’ possession, including a firearm, clothing, and a backpack and its contents. Upon information and belief, the government intends to introduce those items into evidence against Ms. Fallis at trial.

The government alleges that, following her seizure, Ms. Fallis made statements to law enforcement officers and others, both as the product of law enforcement questioning and spontaneously. Upon information and belief, the government intends to introduce those statements into evidence against Ms. Fallis at trial.

²⁹ Exhibit N at 10:02-13:02.

³⁰ Exhibit L, p. 4

³¹ Exhibit L, p. 2

II. STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND ARGUMENT.

A. Summary of the Argument.

Ms. Fallis was seized, and ultimately arrested, without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that she had committed a criminal offense. At the time she was seized, she was lawfully exercising her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Her speech, directed toward law enforcement officers, was political in nature and constitutionally protected.

As a result of her constitutionally unlawful seizure, all of the fruits of that illegal seizure, including evidence located and statements made by Ms. Fallis, should be suppressed.

B. Ms. Fallis Was Exercising Her Right to Political Speech Under the First Amendment When She Was Seized By Law Enforcement Officers in Violation Of Her Rights Under the Fourth Amendment.

1. *Law Enforcement Officers Seized Ms. Fallis Without Legal Authority.*

A seizure occurs when a police officer, by physical force or show of authority, in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen. *Michigan v. Chesternut*, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988); *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Ms. Fallis was seized by law enforcement officers when Deputy Schmidt tackled her from behind, pushed her to the ground, and prevented her from leaving the area.

Law enforcement officers had no warrant for Ms. Fallis' arrest. Therefore, a legitimate seizure of her person depended entirely on the State's possession of "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting" legal wrongdoing. *United States v. Cortez*, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). In other words, in order to justify their seizure of Ms. Fallis, officers had to have a reasonable basis for suspecting that she was committing or had committed a criminal offense.

2. *At the Time of Her Seizure, Ms. Fallis Had Not Committed and Was Not Committing a Criminal Offense.*

“A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment [only] if the arrest is supported by probable cause.” *Maryland v. Pringle*, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (citing *United States v. Watson*, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976)). “To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” *Pringle*, 540 U.S. at 371 (internal citations and quotations omitted); *United States v. Demilia*, 771 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Devenpeck v. Alford*, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[w]hether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the ... officer at the time. . .”) (emphasis added)).

Law enforcement officers comprising an “arrest team” on the lookout for “agitators” targeted Ms. Fallis for arrest when she exercised her First Amendment right to free speech. Ms. Fallis had no physical contact with officers and made no threat of violence toward them as she directed her speech at an arsenal of highly militarized law enforcement officers and their armored vehicles.³² As detailed in the Statement of Facts, *supra*, the arresting officers’ allegations against Ms. Fallis boil down to their claim that she was engaged in excessively zealous and animated speech directed at law enforcement officers at a time when confrontation between water protectors and law enforcement at the scene was otherwise minimal.³³

³² See Exhibit R (screenshot of drone footage provided by the United States in discovery displaying six armored law enforcement vehicles present at police line that Fallis was arrested for allegedly yelling at).

³³ See Exhibit L, p. 3 (noting the lack of confrontation between law enforcement and water protectors at the time of Fallis’ arrest).

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit have held that the First Amendment protects, from the reach of criminal law, critical, zealous, and even aggressively rude speech directed at police.

In *City of Houston, Texas v. Hill*, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt police officers in the performance of their duties was unconstitutionally overbroad, noting that “the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.” *Id.* at 453, 461. The Court emphasized that the “freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.” *Id.* at 462-63. The Court went on to note:

[This decision] reflects the constitutional requirement that, in the face of verbal challenges to police action, officers and municipalities must respond with restraint. . . . [T]he First Amendment recognizes, wisely we think, that a certain amount of expressive disorder not only is inevitable in a society committed to individual freedom, but must itself be protected if that freedom would survive.

Id. at 471-72. The Court also repeated Justice Powell’s previous suggestion that even the “fighting words” exception to the First Amendment may “require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to police because [officers] may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen”. *Id.* at 462 (internal citation and quotations omitted).

The Eighth Circuit has similarly held that the First Amendment precludes arrest on the basis of rude or aggressive speech directed at law enforcement. In *Copeland v. Locke*, 613 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2010), the Eighth Circuit held that “[n]o reasonable police officer could believe that he had actual probable cause to arrest a citizen” for “the use of loud, profane language coupled with [] expressive gestures [pointing]” directed at a police chief while he was actively engaged

in a traffic stop, even after the chief had rejected repeated requests that he move his police vehicle. *Id.* at 878, 880.³⁴ Notably, the Court found that an arrest under these circumstances would be unlawful even if the defendant’s expressive conduct on its face constituted a violation of the relevant statute’s prohibition on interference with a police officer. *Id.* at 880.

In *Buffkins v. City of Omaha*, 922 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1990), the Eighth Circuit found that “as a matter of law . . . officers could not have reasonably concluded that they had probable cause to arrest” a woman who had referred to one of the officers as an “asshole.” *Id.* at 472. The Eighth Circuit noted that “[n]either arresting officer contended that Buffkins” – who was arrested for disorderly conduct – “became violent or threatened violence.” *Id.*; see also, *Copeland, supra*, 613 F.3d at 880 (testimony revealed that appellant “never once physically interfered with, threatened to physically interfere with, or threatened to use any violence against Chief Locke.”). Similarly, although Ms. Fallis’ speech was animated and expressive, she was neither violent nor did she threaten violence to the officers.

Ms. Fallis’ conduct falls squarely within the umbrella of protected speech as prescribed by the *Houston*, *Copeland*, and *Buffkins* Courts. The only officer to comment on the content of her speech recalled hearing her say that “water is life and you’re killing mother earth” and “stuff of that nature”.³⁵ These words could not reasonably be construed as falling under the “fighting words” exception to the First Amendment, especially when directed at a line of police officers. See, *Buffkins, supra.*, 922 F.2d at 472 (finding “officers could not have reasonably concluded that they had probable cause” to arrest a woman for hostile and profane speech directed at police officer) and *Houston, supra*, 462 U.S. at 462 (suggesting a narrower application of fighting

³⁴ The Eighth Circuit held in *Copeland* that the district court had erred in dismissing appellant’s unlawful arrest claims on summary judgment. 613 F.3d at 881.

³⁵ See Exhibit P at 21:35.

words doctrine in cases involving police). In fact, these words represent Ms. Fallis' political and religious beliefs and her utterances of those beliefs are entitled to protection under the First Amendment.

Even if Ms. Fallis' speech interrupted or distracted the officers from their task at hand, which she denies, her seizure was still illegal as she was seized solely based on the exercise of protected expressive speech and conduct. See, *Copeland, supra.* at 880 (“[i]f . . . [appellant was arrested] solely for distracting [the arresting officer] from the stop through the use of his protected expression, then the arrest was unlawful even if it arguably interfered with police activity.”).

Deputies Schmit and Schmidt are frank in their admission that Ms. Fallis was arrested because she was deemed “an agitator” based upon their opinion that she was a loud and aggressive speaker during their extremely short-lived [at most 3 minute] observation of her. Unfortunately for the government's position, the North Dakota Century Code does not criminalize being an “agitator” and the United States Constitution does not tolerate prohibitions on aggressive speech, particularly when it is political in nature or when directed at law enforcement officers. Our government's constraint against arbitrary policing of expression is “one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.” *Houston*, 482 U.S. at 463.

Based upon the holdings in *Houston*, *Copeland*, and *Buffkins*, an objectively reasonable police officer could not have found probable cause to believe that Ms. Fallis was committing or had committed any crime at the time she was seized by law enforcement. Therefore, her seizure and the resulting arrest were unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

3. *The Remedy for Ms. Fallis' Unconstitutional Seizure is Suppression of the Fruits of the Illegal Arrest.*

The exclusionary rule applies to “evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal seizure” as well as “evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or fruit of the poisonous tree.” *United States v. Villa-Gonzalez*, 623 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing *Segura v. United States*, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)). Evidence should be suppressed if “granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality.” *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).

“It is axiomatic that the exclusionary rule bars the admission of physical evidence and live witness testimony obtained through the exploitation of police illegality.” *Hamilton v. Nix*, 809 F.2d 463, 475 (8th Cir. 1987); *Villa-Gonzalez*, 623 F.3d at 535 (upholding suppression of physical evidence discovered in search that was fruit of illegal seizure).

All of the property and physical evidence allegedly recovered from Ms. Fallis at or after her seizure was “obtained through the exploitation of police illegality” and is properly subject to suppression.

“[V]erbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest . . . is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion. . . . Nor do the policies underlying the exclusionary rule invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence.” *Wong Sun*, 371 U.S. at 485-86 (internal citation omitted); see also, *Villa-Gonzalez*, 623 F.3d at 534-35 (suppressing the fruits of defendant’s statement when “the unwarned statements . . . were themselves fruits of an illegal seizure.”).

As with the property allegedly recovered from Ms. Fallis, any statements that she allegedly made while in police custody are a direct result of her unlawful arrest and should be suppressed as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and the products of her unlawful arrest.

C. To the Extent that the Government Contests the Material Facts Herein, the Defendant is Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing.

An evidentiary hearing is required if the moving papers enable the Court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in question. *United States v. Mims*, 812 F.3d 1068, 1073-4 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting *United States v. Losing*, 539 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1976)). The required balancing of factors in favor of and against suppression necessarily occurs on a case-by-case basis. Here, there are specific factual allegations supporting Ms. Fallis’ claim of unconstitutional seizure which, if found by the Court, warrant suppression. To the extent that the government contests the validity of those factual allegations, an evidentiary hearing is required.

III. CONCLUSION.

Because law enforcement officers violated Ms. Fallis’ right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment when they seized her person without a warrant and without probable cause to believe she had committed or was committing a criminal offense, all evidence obtained following and as a result of the initial unlawful seizure should be suppressed.

Respectfully Submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned Counsel of Record for the defendant hereby certifies that a true and accurate copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on the Office of the United States Attorney this 23rd day of October 2017. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system.

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